A Privileged and Pampered Sex?

The following Letter To The editor of Reynolds Newspaper in 1896 (England) provides a snapshot of gender inequity before the law, in this case a gradual softening of female prison experience compliments of a misguided male chivalry – PW

A Privileged and Pampered Sex

TO THE EDITOR OF REYNOLDS NEWSPAPER

1896- Women a priviledged and Pampered Sex - Reynolds's Newspaper - Sunday 29 November 1896SIR,–A paragraph in your issue of the week before last stated that oakum-picking as a prison task had been abolished for women and the amusement of dressing dolls substituted. This is an interesting illustration of the way we are going at present, and gives cause to some reflection as to the rate at which a sex aristocracy is being established in our midst. While the inhumanity of our English prison system, in so far as it affects men, stands out as a disgrace to the age in the eyes of all Europe, houses of correction for female convicts are being converted into agreeable boudoirs and pleasant lounges.

A case in the police court before Sir John Bridge two or three weeks ago further brings into relief the sort of privilege and pampering accorded to one sex at the expense of the other. A woman of the town forced herself upon a young man going home at night and seized hold of his arm. On his shaking her off, the report says “she fell to the ground” (a well-known dodge). Sir John Bridge, on hearing the evidence, was bound to acquit the defendant, but added a rider to his judgement, advising the unfortunate man who had been first assaulted and then had a false charge brought against him, to compensate the woman with half-a-sovereign! Had some luckless male beggar (the brother, let us suppose, of the prosecutrix in this case), after having seized hold of a gentleman’s arm and been shaken off, “fallen to the ground,” and then prosecuted the said gentleman for assault, what would Sir John Bridge or any other Magistrate have said? Would he have suggested 10s. compensation or would he have given him ten weeks? I leave the reader to judge. But the several remarks with which Sir John accompanied his decision are especially noteworthy. He said in effect that “however badly these women behaved” the man ought not to resist them. In fact, the law of self-defence is to be suspended wherever females are the aggressors. This monstrous opinion is on par with the constant iteration in the present day of the “manly” duty of non-resistance and passive obedience to female domination.

We want, sir, a little of the sturdy, healthy, good sense of our ancestors to revisit the glimpses of the moon and speak out against these maudlin, whining, sentimentalisms, and tell us that there are occasions when women, despite the blithering weakness on which they sometimes presume, deserve as severe punishment in their own and the common interest as any male human being who grossly misbehaves himself. That anything in petticoats may ride roughshod over every requirement of decency, justice, or fair-play with impunity is a new doctrine, being assiduously preached, sauced with whimpering appeals to men’s chivalry, gallantry, and the rest of it. Woman’s “weakness” is now fast becoming as oppressive an engine of tyranny and inequality as exists in this or any other country. For though the rich man can sometimes buy off his tormentor, the poor man is handed over by the law, gagged and bound, to the caprices of any vile shrew whom in an evil moment for him he may have made his wife.

I am personally in favour of the abolition of corporal punishment, as I am of existing prison inhumanities, for both sexes, but the snivelling sentiment which exempts females on the ground of sex from every disagreeable consequence of their actions, only strengthens on the one side every abuse which it touches on the other. Yet we are continuously having the din of the “women’s rights” agitation in our ears. I think it is time we gave a little attention to men’s rights, and equality between the sexes from the male point of view.–Yours, &c.,

A MANLY PROTESTOR

The Dream of Heroism and Love – by Johan Huizinga

The following are excerpts from J. Huizinga’s 1924 book The Waning of The Middle Ages, chapter V: The Dream of Heroism and Love. – PW

The knight and his lady, that is to say, the hero who serves for love, this is the primary and invariable motif from which erotic fantasy will always start. It is sensuality transformed into the craving for self-sacrifice, into the desire of the male to show his courage, to incur danger, to be strong, to suffer and to bleed before his lady-love.

From the moment when the dream of heroism through love has intoxicated the yearning heart, fantasy grows and overflows. The first simple theme is soon left behind, the soul thirsts for new fancies, and passion colours the dream of suffering and of renunciation. The man will not be content merely to suffer, he will want to save from danger, or from suffering, the object of his desire. A more vehement stimulus is added to the primary motif: its chief feature will be that of defending imperilled virginity—in other words, that of ousting the rival. This, then, is the essential theme of chivalrous love poetry : the young hero, delivering the virgin. The sexual motif is always behind it, even when the aggressor is only an artless dragon; a glance at Burne-Jones’s famous picture suffices to prove it.

One is surprised that comparative mythology should have looked so indefatigably to meteorological phenomena for the explanation of such an immediate and perpetual motif as the deliverance of the virgin, which is the oldest of literary motifs, and one which can never grow antiquated. It may from time to time become stale from over-much repetition, and yet it will reappear, adapting itself to all times and surroundings. New romantic types will arise, just as the cowboy has succeeded the corsair.

______

Nowhere does the erotic element of the tournament appear more clearly than in the custom of the knight’s wearing the veil or the dress of his lady. In Perceforest we read how the lady spectators of the combat take off their finery, one article after another, to throw them to the knights in the lists. At the end of the fight they are bareheaded and without sleeves. A poem of the thirteenth century, the work of a Picard or a Hainault minstrel, entitled Des trois Chevaliers et del Chainse,1 has worked out this motif in all its force. The wife of a nobleman of great liberality, but not very fond of fighting, sends her shirt to three knights who serve her for love, that one of them at the tournament which her husband is going to give may wear it as a coat-armour, without any mail underneath. The first and the second knights excuse themselves. The third, who is poor, takes the shirt in his arms at night, and kisses it passionately. He appears at the tournament, dressed in the shirt and without a coat of mail; he is grievously wounded, the shirt, stained with his blood, is torn. Then his extraordinary bravery is perceived and he is awarded the prize. The lady gives him her heart. The lover asks something in his turn. He sends back the garment, all blood-stained, to the lady, that she may wear it over her gown at the meal which is to conclude the feast. She embraces it tenderly and shows herself dressed in the shirt as the knight had demanded. The majority of those present blame her, the husband is confounded, and the minstrel winds up by asking the question : Which of the two lovers sacrificed most for the sake of the other?

______

The warlike sports of the Middle Ages differ from Greek and modern athletics by being far less simple and natural. Pride, honour, love and art give additional stimulus to the competition itself. Overloaded with pomp and decoration, full of heroic fancy, they serve to express romantic needs too strong for mere literature to satisfy. The realities of court life or a military career offered too little opportunity for the fine make-belief of heroism and love, which rilled the soul. So they had to be acted. The staging of the tournament, therefore, had to be that of romance ; that is to say, the imaginary world of Arthur, where the fancy of a fairy-tale was enhanced by the sentimentality of courtly love.

Note:

[1] Of the three knights and the shirt.

Riding the Donkey Backwards: Men as the Unacceptable Victims of Marital Violence

By Malcolm J. George

In post-Renaissance France and England, society ridiculed and humiliated husbands thought to be battered and/or dominated by their wives (Steinmetz, 1977-78). In France, for instance, a “battered” husband was trotted around town riding a donkey backwards while holding its tail. In England, “abused” husbands were strapped to a cart and paraded around town, all the while subjected to the people’s derision and contempt. Such “treatments” for these husbands arose out of the patriarchal ethos where a husband was expected to dominate his wife, making her, if the occasion arose, the proper target for necessary marital chastisement; not the other way around (Dobash & Dobash, 1979).

Although the patriarchal view supporting a husband’s complete dominance of his wife persisted into the twentieth century (E. Pleck, 1987), during the latter half of this century, we find a definite shift in people’s attitudes toward marital relationships. Beginning in the 1970s, for instance, advocates like Del Martin (1976) and Erin Pizzey (Pizzey 1974; Pizzey & Shapiro, 1982) exposed the “hidden” secret of domestic violence. As a result, terms like “domestic violence,” “domestic abuse,” and “battered wife” have found their way into our everyday speech. Finally, society seems to be taking the issue of domestic violence against women seriously and looking for solutions to stem if not to end the violence.

Most of the early research dealing with domestic violence focused solely on the female victims and the social factors that supported the victimization of women (Smith, 1989). Consequently, a voluminous literature now exists that portrays domestic violence as a unitary social phenomenon stemming from a patriarchal social order where women are portrayed as the victims and men perceived as the perpetrators (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). Such research has had a significant impact upon the evolution of recent changes in civil law, enforcement of criminal law, and the ways law enforcement and social agencies respond to the needs of battered wives (see Victim Support, 1992).

As noted in the opening section, finding evidence that society in centuries past found it necessary to punish men who did not uphold the patriarchal way suggests previous recognition that a husband could be assaulted or dominated by his wife. In recent years though, such a possibility has found little support or credence. Rather, the view of husband-as-victim of domestic violence is more likely a subject of cartoons (Saenger, 1963) or of jokes about “hen-pecked” husbands (Wilkinson, 1981). In fact, raising the issue of husband-as-victim has spawned a heated controversy within academic circles pitting those who have reported such evidence (see Mills, 1990; Mold, 1990; Straus, Gelles, & Steinmetz, 1980) against those who scoff at such a possibility (see Pagelow, 1985; Pleck, Pleck, & Bart, 1977; Walker, 1989, 1990).

A number of factors apparently are stoking the debate. Among those most often cited are the relative numbers of male versus female victims, the methods used to determine whether or not male victimization has occurred, and the nature and context of female violence. With respect to this last factor, the nature and context of female violence, the debate has widened to include whether the violence perpetrated by a woman against a man is motivated solely in terms of self-defense from either actual or possible bodily threat, whether the violence perpetrated by a woman against a man is in retaliation to previous victimization by a male partner, and whether the resulting injury inflected on a man by a woman is comparable to that inflicted on a woman by a man.

With respect to the first issue much of the data available on domestic violence in the United States, for instance, indicates that, as Mildred Daley Pagelow (1985) argues, females far outnumber males in terms of being the victims of violence. Such is also the conclusion of a literature review prepared for the United Kingdom’s Home Office (Smith, 1989). Given that most studies suggest that domestic violence is exclusively perpetrated by men against women and propose theoretical frameworks to account for this unilateral condition, men who experience unilateral violence at the hands of their wives or female partners have been all but neglected. Dismissed by the argument that few men are actually the victim of spousal abuse or that these few were in all probability men in denial of their own abuse complaining of their spouses’ self-defense needs, the experiences of such men have warranted sparse academic concern.

Another feature preventing serious attention toward the issue of battered men is the belief that studies of battered women will suffice to provide a background for understanding male victims. Further, it has been suggested that in those very few cases of battered men that their social and legal needs are already met within the context of present and available social and legal provisions (Pagelow, 1985).

Although some argue that the relatively few cases of battered men warrant little serious study, incidents of battered men have drawn the attention of numerous social agencies in the United Kingdom, for instance, among the police (Burrell & Brinkworth, 1994; Kirsta, 1994), police surgeons (Harrison, 1986), counseling agencies (Jaevons, 1992; Kirsta, 1991, 1994; Thomas, 1993), probation services (Jaevons, 1992), social agencies like the Samaritans, the Salvation Army, and shelters for the homeless (Harrison, 1986; Jaevons, 1992; Lewin, 1992), psychiatrists and physicians, (Borowski, Murch, & Walker, 1983; Harrison, 1986; Oswald, 1980), fathers’ rights groups (Harrison, 1986), lawyers (Wolff, 1992), and even among those who work with battered women (L. Davidson, personal communication, April, 1994; ; Kirsta, 1991; Lewin, 1992; E. Pizzey, personal communication, December, 1992).

This paper addresses the question of male victimization by reviewing research studies and literature in which domestic violence directed against husbands/male partners has been found or considered. Further, I argue that more research is needed to help define the similarities and differences between male and female victims of domestic violence. The contention that the numbers of battered men in society are very small and thus present an anomaly to the general thinking that women are the only “legitimate” subject of domestic violence is denied. The fact is that taking a serious look at the phenomenon of battered men may actually be a necessary next step to help “de-contaminate” the study of domestic violence (Note 1).

ARE MEN VICTIMS?
RESEARCH AND CONTROVERSY

Although domestic assaults against men have been reported in the literature since the 1950s (Bates, 1981; Straus, 1993), the earliest academic reference to “battered husbands” can be traced to the work of Suzanne Steinmetz (1977, 1977-78). Extrapolating from a small scale study, Steinmetz suggested that the incidence of “husband beating” rivaled the incidence of “wife battering” and that it was husband abuse, not wife abuse, that was a largely underreported form of domestic violence. Her claims received considerable media attention in the United States and elsewhere, but she was savagely attacked for misreading, misinterpreting, and misrepresenting her findings by opponents. Pagelow, for one, (1985) criticized Steinmetz’s evidence on a number of grounds, for instance, the use of aggregate, as opposed to couple samples. Further, she noted that Steinmetz’s work did not address the context in which women were the perpetrators of violence, namely, “self-defense.” Consequently, Pagelow argued that the claim of husband abuse could not be supported and that the “battered husband syndrome” was “much ado about nothing.”

Despite the criticisms leveled at Steinmetz and her concept of the battered husband, violence directed at husbands has been reported by others. For instance, Murray Straus, Richard Gelles, and Suzanne Steinmetz (1980) estimated that about one in eight men in the United States acted violently during marital conflict. However, they estimated a similar number of women also acted violently during marital conflict. They also noted that in a majority of these cases, violence was a mutual or bilateral activity, with only 27% of cases finding that husbands were the sole perpetrators of violence and 24% of cases finding only wives acting violently. With respect to serious violence, as judged by the Conflict Tactics Scales (Note 2), these authors stated that the rate for men beaten by their wives was 4.6%; a figure that indicated “over 2 million very violent wives.” While 47% of those husbands who beat their wives did so severely three or more times a year, 53% of women who beat their husbands severely did so three or more times a year.

In a later article, Straus and Gelles (1986) reviewed both their own and other studies in the United States and reported somewhat equivalent assault rates for both male-to-female and female-to-male. In their 1975 survey, Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz (1980) estimated that approximately 38 out of every 1000 families experience severe husband-to-wife violence, while 46 out of every l000 families experience severe wife-to-husband violence. Ten years later, Straus & Gelles (1986) reported that the rates have dropped from 38 to 30 and 46 and 44 per 1000 couples, respectively. In overall acts of violence, as defined by the Conflict Tactics Scales, husband-to-wife rates of violence were 121 and 113 and wife-to-husband rates of violence were 116 and 121 per 1000 couples for the two study years (i.e., 1975 and 1985).

Although Straus and Gelles (1986) did not dwell on these comparisons, they did make a statement that seems to run counter to the prevailing academic and public perception of the time, namely, that “an important and distressing finding about violence in American families is that, in marked contrast to the behavior of women outside the family, women are about as violent within the family as men” (p. 470). The small change in the wife-to-husband rate of violence, as opposed to some change in the husband-to-wife violence, was suggested to result from a lack of attention or concern to male victimization. The case for giving due regard to domestic women-on-men assaults and an acceptance of this higher level of victimization was backed by reference to other studies finding similar levels of male victimization (Brutz & Ingoldsby, 1984; Gelles, 1974; Giles-Sims, 1983; Jourilles & O’Leary, 1985; Lane & Gwartney-Gibbs, 1985; ; Laner & Thompson, 1982; Makepeace, 1983; Sack, Keller, & Howard, 1982; Saunders, 1986; Scanzoni, 1978; Steinmetz, 1977, 1977-78; Szinovacz, 1983).

In conclusion, summarized such data as Straus and Gelles (1986) indicating that women engage in minor assaults against their male partners at a slightly higher rate than for the same attacks upon women by men. In situations in which both partners use violence, men and women were also almost equally responsible for the first blow, but in only one quarter of these relationships was the man the sole victim. At more potentially injurious levels of assault, men were considered to exceed women in their aggressive behavior and it was suggested that a relative rate in the order of 6 or 7 to 1 (male versus female) was evident for the perpetration of injurious assaults.

Returning to the controversy surrounding the issue of violence against husbands, Straus (1989, 1993) and Straus and Kaufman-Kantor (1994) have extended such observations and reiterated the importance of giving due consideration to the issue. Straus (1993) has pointed out that some studies fail to report findings of female-to-male violence. For instance, Straus noted that in a Kentucky study of battered wives, the study failed to report a 38% rate of unilateral female-to-male violence. Straus further noted that in reviewing over thirty studies, every (Straus’s emphasis) study using a sample that was not self-selecting had found rough equivalence of assault rates for both women and men (e.g., Brush, 1990; Sorensen & Telles, 1991). Some of the variation in the reports of incidence of violence directed against husbands or male partners could be attributed to the difference in whether the studies surveyed the general population or were based upon samples of reported victims as found in police records or agencies dealing with domestic violence. The much lower rates of male victimization evident from studies on samples of victims of domestic violence drawn from victimization programs police records, or other similar agencies working in the field were suggested to introduce a “clinical sample fallacy” into the debate. In contrast evidence derived from the use of the Conflict Tactics Scales, although widely recognized and used, has been criticized by some as seemingly giving credence to attacks by women upon men by erroneously equating female assaults with potentially more harmful male assaults (e.g., Bogarde, 1990; Kurz, 1993).

Several American and Canadian studies have indicated levels of female violence against husbands or male partners as more than just an anomaly or a small percentage of isolated individual cases. For instance, Nisonoff and Bitman (1979) reported that 15.5% of men and 11.3% of women reported having hit their spouse, while 18.6% of men and 12.7% of women reported having been hit by their spouse. Studies of both dating and married/cohabiting couples have also found that women admit committing unilateral acts of violence against their male partners at levels not greatly dissimilar to those committed by men (Arias & Johnson, 1989). In a survey of 884 United States university students, Breen (1985) found that both male and female students reported being the victim of an act of violence by a romantic partner in approximately equal proportions (18% of the men and 14% of the women). And among married male students, Breen found that 23% reported being slapped, punched, or kicked, while 9% reported being the victim of an assault involving a weapon and a similar percentage reported receiving injuries that required them to seek medical treatment. In a study of particular interest, as it surveyed patients attending an emergency department, Goldberg and Tomianovich (1984) found that men constituted 38% of the victims of spousal violence.

Bland and Orn (1986), in a Canadian study of the relationships between family violence, psychiatric disorder, and alcohol abuse, found that men and women were nearly equal in committing acts of violence against their partners. In another study, this time for 562 married and co-habiting couples living in Calgary, Canada, Brinkerhoff and Lupri (1988) found nearly twice as much wife-to-husband, as husband-to-wife, severe violence. Using data derived again from the Conflict Tactics Scales, these researchers reported a 4.7% rate of severe violence in husband-to-wife relationships while a 10.4% rate was found for wife-to-husband severe violence. These authors also suggested that male violence decreased with level of educational attainment, but female violence increased. Also Sommers, Barnes, and Murray (1992) reported a higher incidence of at least one incident of partner abuse for females as opposed to males (39.1% versus 26.3%).

In the United Kingdom, surveys of domestic incidents are more restricted than the National Family Violence Survey or other comparable surveys in the United States or Canada (Smith, 1989). However, if we allow as evidence the reporting in the popular media, evidence of male victims can be found. For instance, in a UK survey of 2,075 people about family life reported in the popular press, Moller (1991) reported that three times as many women, as men, admitted hitting their spouse or partner. Individual case histories of battered men have also been reported in various popular presses as well as details of an unpublished British study, using the Conflict Tactics Scales, where similar results were found (e.g., Kirsta, 1989, 1991, 1994; Stacey & Cantacuzino, 1993; Wolff, 1992). In an article reviewing a number of legal cases, Bates (1981) commented that while “little had been written about male victimization, it was not difficult to find male victims from even a superficial search of case law.”

By contrast, a study of police and court records in Scotland found that only 2.4% of cases involved a male victim (Dobash & Dobash, 1978). Two other studies in the United Kingdom gave a somewhat different picture. Borowski, Murch, and Walker (1983) in a survey of fifty general practitioners found that just over 80% of physicians reported seeing a case of a female victim of domestic violence about once every six months, but totally unsolicited, 27% of the physicians reported seeing a male victim with about the same frequency. In a study by psychiatrists in Scotland, Oswald (1980) reported on 299 women involved in violent relationships. Forty-six percent of these women reported being both victims of violence by a spouse/partner or near relative and perpetrators of violence towards their spouse/partner or near relative. Another 12% stated they had been violent towards a spouse/partner or near relative, but received no violence from them. In a more recent UK study, Smith, Baker, Buchan, and Bodiwala (1992) reported on the results of their gender-blind study of victims of domestic assaults attending Leicester Royal Infirmary casualty department. Retrospective study of the casualty department records for 1988, of assault victims of both genders who identified their injury as arising from “domestic incidents,” found an incidence of male victims of spousal assault. Covering a number of categories of inter-relational violence within the home, eleven men and 55 women were positively identified as the victim of an assault by their spouse or partner. Another six men and 30 women were identified as having been assaulted by a romantic partner. In the total study of 142 male and 155 female identified victims, an interesting feature was the fact that 59% of males and 25% of females did not identify their assailant.

Furthermore, reports of male victims of female-perpetrated domestic violence can be found using data from Australia (Scutt, 1981). Thus academic literature reporting studies of domestic violence from four countries (United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia) has reported an incidence of male victimization from zero to slightly higher than the incidence of female victimization. While a surprising number of studies find rates of male victimization, the data is not always complete. What is clear, however, is that assaults by women against their husbands or male partners do occur. This is even acknowledged by some of critics of the concept of “battered men” (Walker, 1990). Whatever the incidence of female assaults on male partners is, Pagelow’s (1985) view that male victimization hardly ever occurs is being challenged by numerous researchers coming from a variety of disciplines and research areas (Macchieto,1992). Further, the debate about battered men is becoming more heated, as more men come forth and publicly describe their status as victims of domestic abuse (see Aardoom, 1993; Edwards, 1992; Greenfield, 1992; Raeside, 1993; Smith, 1992; Thomas, 1993; and Turner, 1988).

ON THE NATURE OF ASSAULTS AGAINST HUSBANDS

SELF-DEFENSE?

A major criticism leveled at Steinmetz’s claim of “battered husbands” was that she failed to address the context or the situation that would have prompted a woman to act violently against her male partner. The critics claimed that in those (rare) cases when a woman attacked a man such an assault was in all probability justified in terms of self-defense, stemming from either his previous assaults or the likelihood of imminent assault. Initially, owing to this criticism and believing that most assaults by women on men would be in self-defense, Straus did not pursue any of the initial interest from the original 1975 survey (Straus, 1993). Subsequently, however, reviewing both their own and other studies in the United States, somewhat equivalent assault rates for both male-to-female and female-to-male were identified and discussed (Straus & Gelles, 1986) in the context of this criticism. Detailed considerations to take account of the severity of assault, different reporting and surveying methodologies, and the likelihood that assaults were in self-defense or in response to previous victimization were addressed. It was argued from national survey data that the reported rates at which women admitted a violent act against their spouse and the rate that men reported an attack upon them, seemed to indicate that all female-to-male violence could not be exclusively explained as only women retaliating in self-defense. The responses of women themselves concerning unprovoked assaults on their male partners also mitigated against self-defense as being the sole reason for female-to-male violence. Additionally, the higher median and mean rates of assaultive behavior for women in such studies also mitigates against an explanation that all assaults by women are in self-defense (McNeely & Robinson-Simpson, 1987).

She repeatedly started fights, then called the police accusing him of assault. The cops refused to believe that he had been the victim. It had reached the point where he would stand with his hands clasped behind his back refusing to react or retaliate in any way, while she attacked him with her fists and her nails. (Thomas, 1993, p. 167)

In concluding whether assaults by women were always in self-defense, Straus (1993) pointed out that every study that had investigated who initiates violence, using methods that did not preclude the wife as the instigator, has found that wives instigate violence in a large proportion of cases. Straus’ case that women are likely to be violent in the home is given further support by observations of the behavior of young women in a youth assessment center. The levels of aggression and violence by females has been reported to be as high as for males, but in contrast to the males, is more likely to be expressed inside the center rather than outside in public places (Kirsta, 1994, p. 322). Straus stresses, however, that the high level of violence by women in the studies he reviews might not indicate who started the argument or whether wives attacked as a way of obviating a potential assault from their physically more able male partner.

Critics of Straus’s thesis point out that such evidence against assaults by wives being in self-defense, which are based upon data obtained from the Conflict Tactics Scales, fail to take account of the occurrence of acts of violence before the survey year for which questions are asked and fail to take account of the more serious potential for injury to women (Bogarde, 1990; Kurz, 1993; Pagelow, 1985). Thus, it is suggested that assaults by women may be a result of abuse and violence in previous years by the husband or male partner. Straus (1993), in reply to such criticism, has stated that he considers at least some writers to misrepresent his published work in respect to the victimization of both women and men (e.g., Kurz, 1993). Nowhere perhaps is controversy more acute than in the argument over assaults made by women that result in death of their male partner. In this instance, considerable attention has been paid to the cumulative process of abuse that may lead a woman to commit such an attack out of shear desperation (Walker, 1993). Even here, however, Mann (1989) has propounded that there is room for doubting that all such attacks are as a result of “delayed” self-defense by noting that not one woman in her sample of women imprisoned for murdering husbands or lovers had been battered. Straus (1989, 1993) and Sommer, Barnes, and Murray (1992) have also noted that other studies of homicides indicate women not acting in self-defense.

INJURY OR NON-INJURY?

The final dismissal of violence by wives against husbands or male partners derives from the assumption that female violence is not as injurious or is less injurious than violence perpetrated by men. Data already discussed indicates that assaults by women on men can fall into the more serious category of the Conflict Tactics Scales or, in other words, the level of assault at which there is much greater risk of injury. Reviewing data obtained in hospitals, both Goldberg and Tomianovich (1984) and Smith (et al., 1992) found that male victims received injuries that required medical attention. Smith (et al. 1992) also reported that males tended to receive more severe injuries and lost consciousness more often than women.

[A] man was admitted to Barts [St. Bartholomew’s Hospital, London] after his wife had split his head with a meat knife. He was lucky to escape with his life. (quoted in Harrison, 1986, p. 34)

I’ve sewn up men who have had crockery thrown at them and bottles smashed over their heads. I once saw a man who looked as if he’d walked into a steamroller … he was covered in bruises and cuts. (quoted in Harrison, 1986, p. 35)

In one well publicized case last year, Mrs. D… C…, ripped off one of her husbands testicles. Surgeons failed to save it and the judge ordered the woman to pay £480 in costs. A judge ordered Mrs. C… to pay court costs of £480 but did not make a compensation order. (quoted in Wolff, 1992, p. 22)

It must be pointed out, however, that in the case of the United Kingdom study (Smith et al, 1992), victims had been attacked by a variety of related and unrelated aggressors in the home, and some male victims could have received greater injuries as a result of attacks by men. The upper body strength of the average woman is less than that of the average man and so it is possible to argue that there is less ability to injure. However, the difference in strength need not be large (Fausto-Sterling, 1992). Reference has also been made to the disparities in method of assault used by women as opposed to men (Flynn, 1990; Straus, 1980) whereby a woman attacking a man tends to use methods of assault not dependent upon strength, for example, using a household implement as a weapon. Seeking to determine whether females sustained greater injury than males, McLeod (1984) reported on an analysis of 6,200 cases of domestic assaults reported to law enforcement officers or the National Crime Survey interviewers. Therein, she reported that women, in attacking men, were more likely to use weapons (75% of females used weapons while 25% of males did so). Although the numbers of women attacked in the sample were larger, the extent of the injuries suffered by the male victims tended to be more serious. Thus women made up for their lack of physical strength by using a weapon, usually a household object. The prevalence of women using weapons has been reported in United Kingdom studies (George, 1992) as well as in an Australian study of battered husbands (B. Thurston, personal communications, May-November, 1993). These findings are in keeping with the suggestion that women are more prone to use weapons and forms of assault that do not depend upon physical strength for their efficacy (Straus, 1980). The rate at which men might report injuries, and indeed attacks, was also suggested to conceal the extent of male victimization; a point that has been made by others (Mack, 1989; McNeely & Robinson-Simpson, 1987). Evidence that men view attacks made upon them and the resulting injuries somewhat differently than women’s reactions was presented by Adler (1981) in a paper that was essentially refuting domestic violence against men. The consequence of this tendency to underreport, which is also very evident by women victims, would have considerable implications for the reported incidence of male victimization.

I suffered broken ribs…. I certainly never seriously contemplated taking any action that might have resulted in her being charged with assault. (Scottish victim, abstracted from a personal letter to author, March, 1992)

In any case, Straus (1989, 1993) has pointed out that dismissing male victimization on the basis of less or lack of injury has implications for the whole consideration of domestic violence. By noting the difference between the figures derived from the Conflict Tactics Scales studies and injury adjusted rates, he pointed out that the number of women victimized would be drastically reduced, even though they had still been technically assaulted in the home and potentially left fearful. Thus it could also be considered an inequity to dismiss non-injurious attacks against men on this basis and assumes that even non-injurious attacks on a man are of no psychological trauma; a view that presupposes a stereotypical attitude towards men. Psychological trauma of men as a result of threat or stressful life events is established by literature from both physiological and psychological studies (Frankenhaeuser, 1975; Stoney, Davis, & Mathews, 1987) and the social sciences (e.g., Travato, 1986).

The danger is, however, that this view could either result in, or be used to legitimize, subsequent attacks by the man (Straus, 1989,1993; Straus & Gelles, 1986). It is clearly appropriate that concern should be addressed to even non-injurious assault given the fact that medically it is well established that, for instance, blows to the head need only inflict superficial soft-tissue injury to be associated with loss of consciousness and potential for neural or cerebrovascular trauma (Kelly, Nichols, Filey, Lilliehei, Rubinstein, & Kleinschmidt-DeMasters, 1991).

THE CONTEXT OF VIOLENCE?

Little attention has been paid within the debate over battered husbands as to the reasons why women might attack their male partners other than for reasons of self-defense (Makepeace, 1983; Walker, 1984). The prevalent thinking underlying why men attack their female partners rests upon the notion that men need to control women (Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Makepeace, 1983; Walker, 1984). In contrast, even Straus (1993) tends to discuss female violence against male partners only with reference to either self-defense or “slap the cad” scenarios that imply an element of justification.

Not all accounts accept the notion that a woman’s aggressive behavior toward a man is a consequence of her need to protect herself from imminent danger, though. For instance, in a chapter dealing with violent women, Shupe, Stacey, and Hazlewood (1987) argue against the “universal” application of the self-defense motive in women’s aggression noting that “women’s violence cannot be dismissed as sheer rationalization” (p. 52). Women can act in very aggressive ways for reasons other than self-defense. Certainly, the aggression found among some lesbian couples cannot be attributed to self-defense only (Hart, 1986; Renzetti, 1992), including among some couples a high level of sexual coercion (Waterman, Dawson, & Bologna, 1989). The fact is that women are capable of performing instrumental acts of aggression against their partners. Some have argued that women’s aggression toward men, as well as men’s toward women, can be attributed to their need to dominate, possess, or from feelings of insecurity (Marsh, 1976). In the author’s governmental report dealing with battered men (George, 1992), two thirds of the male victims surveyed identified “bullying” or “control” as the major reason why they felt their wives used violence in their relationship. Similar findings are also reported in studies of abused husbands in Australia (B. Thurston, personal communications, May-November, 1993) and Canada (Gregorash, 1993). Bates (1981), in his review of legal cases, such as Willan vs. Willan (United Kingdom), Keehn vs. Keehn (United States), Green vs. Green (Canada), and Sangster vs. Sangster (South Australia), found evidence of bullying, massive ill-treatment, and acts that caused danger to life and limb. Thus these isolated reports of male victims seem to indicate that, at least in some cases, violence directed at men by their wives has very similar motivation and content to that reported for men’s aggression against their wives.

Also as women are often the victims of sexual aggression (Walker, 1989), reports of male victims of female sexual abuse can be found in the literature (Bates, 1981; Stets & Pirgood, 1989; Struckman-Johnson, 1988; Swet, Survey, & Cohan, 1990; Thomas, 1993; Travin, Cullen, & Potter 1990). Further, such sexual abuse can be very devastating for the male victims (Sarrel & Masters, 1982).

Some have suggested that battered husbands may precipitate their wives’ violence by being “emotionally unresponsive” (Harrison, 1986; Kusta, 1991), inattentive (Straus, 1993), or being physically weak or disabled (Pagelow, 1985). The suggestion, however, that a man’s “emotional passivity” or “inattentiveness” may be the cause for some women’s assaultive behavior can hardly be used to justify such behavior. Arguably, we would never justify a man’s assault on a woman, for instance, for her passivity or inattentiveness.

Early accounts of battered wives echoed popular misconceptions that such women were to blame for their victimization (Pizzey & Shapiro, 1982). Recently, such victim blaming has been firmly rebutted as little more than a mechanism for the abuser to escape or excuse his antisocial actions (Smith, 1989). Victim blaming is also very much a problem suffered by battered men; while it’s roots lie in humor of the hen-pecked husband variety, it can also be seen within academic analysis of violence against husbands. For instance, Adler (1981) suggested that some men may be accepting and unconcerned by their partners assaults, express jocularity at them, and thus see no reason to end the relationship despite being exposed to violence. It is open to question whether such denial by a victim of his victimization is anything other than an attempt to suppress such feelings and to escape stigmatization by using humor, even though self-directed. Men may view violence towards them and even the resulting injuries with little overt concern, arguably though experiencing inward trauma, all because of the need to deny a sense of their vulnerability (Levant, 1991). The “slap the cad” scenario would seem to be an instance of the application of blame on the male victim based on stereotypical notions that it is not injurious and that men should accept such admonishment for any and all perceived failings in their behavior.

A confluence between male and female domestic violence in terms of defined psychiatric conditions was suggested by Bates (1981), although it has also been estimated independently that less than ten per cent of family violence can be explained by psychopathology (Gelles & Straus, 1988). In contrast, some have suggested that family violence is highly prevalent among individuals with particular mental health problems (Gondolf, Mulvey, & Lidz, 1989). Sommers, Barnes, and Murray (1992) have criticized the view, derived from sociological study, that mental disorders play a negligible role in the genesis of family violence. For instance, Bland and Orn (1986) found a positive correlation between certain personality disorders, alcohol abuse, and violence against either a spouse or children in both male and female aggressors. Sommers, Barnes, and Murray (1992) found certain factors more predictive for both female and male abusers, namely, being young and achieving high scores on Eysenck’s Psychoticism Scale, the Neurotiscism Index, and the McAndrew Scale. Similarly, O’Leary (1993) found that the men in his sample who batter also scored high on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, measures of emotional lability, or evidenced certain personality disorders.

Thus, despite the fact that certain psychiatric conditions are thought associated with a propensity toward violence, there has been relatively little consideration of the role of psychiatric/psychological criteria in the genesis of inter-spousal violence in much of the literature. For instance, jealousy has been linked to patterns of abuse and even homicide among men and women (Bourlet, 1990; Docherty & Ellis, 1976; Freeman, 1990; Renzetti, 1992; Seeman, 1979; Tarrier, Beckett, & Ahmed, 1989).

If we are to develop a cogent theory of the causes of family violence we need to integrate and define the interplay between the social, psychological, and physiological factors (Johnston & Campbell, 1993). Rather than assume we have all the answers by focusing only on the social (e.g., issues of power in relationships) or the psychological (e.g., need to dominate), we must look at all the possibilities. For instance, further research is needed to understand better the underlying neurochemical abnormalities (e.g., dysfunction of the Raphe 5-Hydroxytryptamine system), which leads to impulsivity, heightened aggressiveness, and violent behaviors in some individuals. Medical studies indicate that some women, as well as some men, are found to have conditions that might predispose towards violence and abuse of a partner (Brown et al., 1979; Lidberg, Asberg, & Sundqvist-Stensman, 1984; Lidberg et al., 1985; Linnoila et al., 1983). Rather than focus on purely social theories of family violence we need to reexamine partner abuse in light of what the neurosciences can tell us of such behaviors as well.

MEN AS VICTIMS: THE GREAT TABOO

Straus & Gelles (1986) sum up much of the problem we find when discussing male victims of female violence when they say “Violence by wives has not been an object of public concern. There has been no publicity, and no funds have been invested in ameliorating this problem because it has not been defined as a problem” (p. 472, italics added). It can be argued that by defining wife battering as the problem, and husband battering as a non-problem, realistic estimates of husband-battering, be they large or small, are nearly impossible to obtain. It is easy, for instance, to argue that battered husbands occur only as rare and isolated cases. Nearly all male victims are isolated individuals owing to the relative paucity of groups willing to acknowledge their victim status. The fact is that a large proportion of the social agencies that deal with family violence target only female victims. Thus we should not be surprised if these groups do not find evidence of male victims of domestic violence. Further, the politicized nature of domestic violence among many within academia mitigates against finding any evidence of male victims (Note 3). Consequently, some professionals, like mental health professionals, may be insensitive or even hostile to a man describing himself in victim terms (Macchieto, 1992). Added to all this, the traditional stereotypes give creditability to a woman to be seen as a victim. The stereotypes associated with men, however, lead most to deny such a possibility or to ridicule’ such a notion as male-as-victim (Farrell, 1993; Wilkinson, 1981). This clearly deters men from making such an admission (Machietto, 1992; Steinmetz, 1980). Also, male victims may be aware, if only dimly, that to proclaim victim status will only lead to unfavorable or unequal treatment compared with female victims (Harris & Cook, 1994).

If a man is attacked by his wife and decides to call the police, he is the one who is likely to be arrested. (quoted in Wolff, 1992, p. 22)

She was knocking the shit out of me; no one would believe me. (Male victim and resident of the Kingsland Estate, Hackney, London, England speaking on Kingsland, Channel 4, television documentary, 4th June 1992)

When you are talking to your mates, it’s hard to admit you’re being bullied by a woman. (quoted in Kent, 1993, p. 37)

If they knew how she knocks me about, and the fact that every time it happens she manages to take me by surprise, catching me off guard, can you imagine how they’d take the piss? (quoted in Kirsta, 1994, p. 237)

Steinmetz (1980) has suggested that some men, following traditional social norms, consider it unmanly to attack or even retaliate against an assault by a woman. Further, when men and women rate violent male-female interactions, they perceive male-to-female aggression as more negative than female-to-male aggression (Arias & Johnson, 1989). By implication, female-to-male violence has a type of social acceptance not accorded to male-to-female violence (Greenblatt, 1983). Thus while it is argued that “society does not appear to shape the attitudes of most men and women to accept the use of violence by men against women…” (O’Leary, 1993, p. 24), we could suggest that society does appear to condone the use of violence by a woman against a man.

And finally, the whole issue of male victimization can be suggested to receive scant attention because of the threat it poses to masculine self images and “patriarchal” authority, as much as for any threat it poses towards efforts to counter female victimization. The lack of attention of female aggression, as opposed to male aggression, has been suggested to be rooted in scholarly debates on nature, culture, and gender in which “sameness” or “differences” are key issues; but actually result from a reluctance to consider similarities between men and women, as opposed to differences (Fry & Gabriel, 1994). Thus it is not surprising that domestic violence against women, as opposed to men, is a socially acceptable concern and receives study and support. This reinforces two more easily recognized social stereotypes, female vulnerability and male authority or dominance, and protectiveness. The admission and recognition of male victimization, in the battered husband, is the antithesis of this acceptable order and an equality between the sexes that has been resisted historically, especially by men (e.g., see judgments in the Willan vs. Willan and Teal vs. Teal cases, Bates, 1981).

It can be argued that the social values (e.g., patriarchy) that form the foundation for male violence against women, also underpin the lack of acceptance of the battered husband. Why the “battered husband syndrome” is so belittled and considered a non-social problem can be found in the patriarchal ethos that reinforces female victimization. By rooting the debate on domestic violence only in notions such as gender and physical size or strength, rather than the inherent attitudes and propensity of individuals to use violence and abuse as an interrelational strategy, female victimization will continue as will the unseen victimization of some men both inside and outside the home. The fact that so many in society, including some academics, are so unwilling to accept the unilateral battering of men by women stems, in large part, from the deep and profoundly disturbing challenge such a fact poses to cherished male and female stereotypes.

While most only view male victims of domestic violence as the subject of incredulity or objects of humor, the fact is that some men are battered. No matter their number, battered men deserve better than to be seen as little more than footnotes from earlier historical periods when they were castigated and forced to ride a donkey backwards.

NOTES

1. Richard Gelles and Murray Straus (1988), two of the leading researchers in family violence, have described how the often inflammatory debate over the issue of battered men helped to squelch any serious study of the subject as well as sent a signal to many well-intentioned scholars to avoid the field totally. They write:

Perhaps the most unfortunate outcome of the wrangle over battered men is that since the debate in the late 1970s, there has been virtually no additional research carried out on the topic. The furor among social scientists and in the public media has contaminated the entire topic. Consequently, we have refused every request for an interview or to appear on any talk show on this topic for fear of yet again being misquoted, miscast, or misrepresented. Other social scientists who witnessed the abuse heaped on our research group—especially on Suzanne Steinmetz—have given the topic of battered men a wide berth. (pp. 105-106, italics added)

2. The Conflict Tactics Scales, devised by Murray Straus (1978, 1979) and several co-workers at the University of Minnesota, consists of several scales designed to assess the various ways that family members try to deal with conflicts in the home. The Conflict Tactics Scales is divided in three parts, with one part asking a series of questions about escalating levels of threatened or actual physical assault between adult partners. Starting with “Threatened to hit or throw something at the other,” it concludes with “used a knife or gun on the other.” The eight point scale is often analyzed by researchers in terms of less serious and more serious violence; more serious violence being those acts more likely to cause injury. See Straus (1993) for a recent discussion of the validity and criticisms of The Conflict Tactics Scales.

3. We could argue that “husband-battering” is a more emotionally contested and politically charged issue in the U.S. than in many other industrialized countries. In Sweden, for instance, refuges have been established for male victims of domestic violence (Kirsta, 1994). In another example of the difference in attitudes toward male victims, Detective Inspector Sylvia Aston, West Midlands Police Force (UK), reported:

We’ve made absolutely sure through our training that no officer will ever dismiss a male domestic violence victim just because he’s a man. We don’t take the attitude that a man can leave—many can’t And it’s invariably the nice sensitive ones who get battered. I think we risk going down a very dangerous path by discriminating between the sexes in these offenses. Some of the most violent people I’ve dealt with as an officer are women, and if you don’t judge a woman by her crime, but by her gender, then not only do you perpetrate the old, misleading stereotypes but you risk such offenses recurring, perhaps in another relationship. Domestic violence as we see it is not a women’s issue—it’s a social issue. (quoted in Kirsta, 1994, p. 229)

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Swet, C., Survey, J., & Cohan, C. (1990). Sexual and physical abuse histories and psychiatric symptoms among male psychiatric patients. American Journal of Psychiatry, 147, 632-636.

Szinovacz, M. E. (1983). Using couple data as a methodological tool: The case of marital violence. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 45, 633-644.

Tarrier, N., Beckett, R., & Ahmed, Y. (1989). Comparison of a morbidly jealous and a normal female population on the Eysenck Personality Questionaire (EPQ). Journal of Personal and Individual Differences, 10, 1327-1328.

Thomas, D. (1993). Not guilty: The case in defense of men. New York; William Morrow.

Travato, F. (1986). The relationship between marital dissolution and suicide: The Canadian case. Journal of Marriage and Family, 48, 341-348.

Travin, S., Cullen, K., & Potter, B. (1990). Female sex offenders: Severe victims and victimizers. Journal of Forensic Science, 35, 140-150.

Turner, J. (1988). Behind closed doors. London: Thorsons.

Victim Support. (1992). Domestic violence: Report of a national interagency working party on domestic violence. London: Victim Support.

Walker, L. E. A. (1984). The battered women syndrome. New York: Springer.

Walker, L. E. A. (1989). Terryfying love: Why battered women kill and how society responds. New York: Harper Collins.

Walker, L. E. A. (1990). Response to Mills and Mold. American Psychologist, 45, 676-677

Waterman, C. K., Dawson, D. A., & Bologna, J. (1989). Sexual coercion in gay male and lesbian relationships: Predictors and implications for support services. Journal of Sex Research, 1, 118-124.

Wilkinson, M. (1981). Children and divorce: The practice of social work. Oxford: Blackwells.

Wolff, I. (1992, November 28). Domestic violence: The other side. The Spectator, 22-26

See also:

– “Stang riding” as punishment for male victims of intimate partner violence
– Fire-poker princesses: an evidence-based snapshot of female violence in nineteenth-century England
– The Henpecked Club: A 200 Year Fellowship of Abused Husbands

MGTOW & bachelorhood

MGTOW philosophy

Perspectives on MGTOW (Men Going Their Own Way) – a significant post-gynocentrism subculture based on the principle of male self-determination.

MGTOW: on the origin of gynocentrism
How to tame men – gynocentrism style
Gynocentrism – why so hard to kill?
MGTOW – facts and fallacies
What are MGTOW against?
Early references to “Men going their own way”
Definition of MGTOW
Self-determination: phrase origins
A MGTOW Yardstick: Determination Of Self By Other (DOSBO)
On the nature of MGTOW self-determination
MGTOW: 12th century style
MGTOW movement of 1898
Authoring your own life
Don’t just do something, SIT THERE
The historical role of gynocentrism in societal collapse

Marriage shunning

The following collection of articles describe the post-gynocentrism phenomenon of marriage shunning by males, and the rationale behind it.
No marriage

Marriage is a gynocentric custom
Slavery 101 – dating as taught to girls
Valentine’s Day: gynocentrism’s most holy event
Women complaining about lack of available slavemasters
Men not marrying
Men shouldn’t marry
Marriage is obsolete. Are women?
Men on strike: why men are boycotting marriage
Don’t give up on marriage? Request denied
Down the aisle again on the marriage question

Post-gynocentrism relationships

Post-gynocentrism relationships between men and women are possible and even desirable for many people. The following articles explore how relationships can be revisioned.

friends

Hail to the V
The other Beauty Myth
Sex and Attachment
Love and Friendship
Pleasure-seeking vs. relationships
On the marriage question

Post-gynocentrism culture

Articles (mostly from AVfM) exploring post-gynocentrism culture. Each article presents a post-gynocentrism paradigm for individual or collective existence.

How to end gynocentrism
Gynocentrism – why so hard to kill?
Freedom from gynocentrism in 12 Steps
Breaking the pendulum: Tradcons vs. Feminists
Why anyone who values freedom should be fighting against feminism
A Voice for Choice
Gynocentrism and the hierarchy of entitlement
The Counterculture
MHRM: counterculture or subculture?
On creating a counter-culture
A little blood in the mix never hurt a revolution

Gynocentrism Theory Lectures (Adam Kostakis)

The following seminal lectures on Gynocentrism Theory were given in 2011 by Adam Kostakis:

 

GYNOCENTRISM THEORY LECTURE SERIES:
1. Staring Out From the Abyss
2. The Same Old Gynocentric Story
3. Refuting the Appeal to Dictionary
4. Pig Latin
5. Anatomy of a Victim Ideology
6. Old Wine, New Bottles
7. The Personal, as Contrasted to the Political
8. Chasing Rainbows
9. False Consciousness & Kafka-Trapping
10. The Eventual Outcome of Feminism, Part I
11. The Eventual Outcome of Feminism, Part II
12. How to Break a Dialectic

 

SEE ALSO:

Adam Kostakis – Is gynocentrism a biological essential? (2011)
Adam Kostakis – Is gynocentrism a narcissistic pathology? (2011)

Adam Kostakis also wrote articles at A Voice for Men under the username Tom Snark:

Hanna Rosin Abusing her Children: ON VIDEO
Till Death Do Us Part
Happy Father’s Day, You Piece Of Shit
Conscious Men Guilty Of Misogyny
The Kind Of People We Are Dealing With
Those In Crass Houses
Feminist Kia Abdullah Laughs At Recently Deceased Men
The times, they have a-changed

Chasing Rainbows

Lecture No. 8

“Equality, rightly understood as our founding fathers understood it, leads to liberty and to the emancipation of creative differences; wrongly understood, as it has been so tragically in our time, it leads first to conformity and then to despotism.” – Barry Goldwater

What is it that enables us to live meaningful lives? This is a question with a long history, and after more than two thousand years of scratching our heads, our species is not much the wiser. Answers fall just as easily as they are formed. Perhaps the only real wisdom to be imparted by centuries of soul-searching is that the solution cannot be reduced to the realization of only one value. Efforts to bring about a social system based upon the realization of one value in particular – be it religious doctrine, the will of the nation, or social equality – have invariably resulted in widespread repression, and not the golden age of peace and virtue as postulated by their ideologues. In contrast, those societies which have managed to create and maintain the space for people to actually live what they might call ‘meaningful lives’ are those which have kept a number of values in balance. This is not a very exciting solution, but it is better to be dissatisfied with the great mysteries of life than to be enserfed or ‘disappeared’ by a regime in pursuit of a more enticing dictum.

Whatever the case, the argument for autonomy seems convincing – balanced, as it must be, against other values. It is difficult to see how one’s life could be considered meaningful where one does not possess even the most basic rights of self-determination. On this point, I am superficially in agreement with the feminists, who have made autonomy (and not equality) their guiding principle. Of course, in their case, it is only women’s autonomy that matters, and this is to be extended as far as possible. Nevertheless, we do agree that autonomy, in and of itself, is a good thing, although I would qualify my support with the corollary that it must be balanced against other values so that it does not become license.

It is the most spectacular irony, then, that so long as they remain feminists, women will never knowingly taste freedom. Feminism is a victim ideology which freezes women perpetually in Struggle; it cannot afford to indulge in Liberation, else the game is up. To continue playing, feminists must imagine that they are under the control of external forces which are responsible for every fate that befalls them. They have a name for this mass delusion: The Patriarchy. Every bad decision, every unwanted consequence, every minor inconvenience can be traced back to this mystical, mythical and invisible system of control which exerts influence over women, in much the same way that animistic tribes explained severe weather phenomena by reference to angered and vengeful deities. If feminists are to pretend that Struggle is still relevant, then it cannot be admitted that women are in control of their own actions, for this would imply that they are free moral agents. Women must be made to believe that they are delicate vessels being tossed about in an ocean storm, with navigation and steering rendered futile, and no land in sight. Perhaps we could contrast this to the MGTOW movement, which resembles a series of wooden canoes, light but durable, whose occupants paddle alone on calm seas – for the time being, at least.

pirate-ship-sinking

Even when women are privileged beyond their wildest dreams – which is inconceivable in feminist theory – they still may not be considered free. Women are not permitted to enjoy freedom; it must be denied for the ideology to survive. It must be reiterated, until it comes to mind reflexively, that “we still live in a patriarchy,” and “women are still not yet equal,” and so forth. Feminism’s adherents can never rest, because they will not allow themselves to. They are forever chasing rainbows.

They are mentally barricaded in, shut off from the very world that they impose their designs upon. They are forced to conceive of themselves forever Struggling, lest they become Liberated, and therefore irrelevant. As I said last week, a tripartite perception of history (past as Oppression, present as Struggle, and future as Liberation) is a constant of feminism, and this is decided upon in advance of the facts. Regardless of context, the present is Struggle, with Liberation perpetually set some way off into the future. As the proverb states, tomorrow never comes.

As I have mentioned previously, feminism is fundamentally anti-contextual, deciding upon the story in advance, and then fitting the facts around this. The process is simple. Take the key points about the given situation, and through the use of dislogic, eristic, moral relativism, symbolism, self-contradiction and dreamlike fantasy, frame the discourse as one in which women are moving from Oppression to Liberation, but will not get there without feminist Struggle.

This is not to say that feminism operates statically. The first step in the process just described is to draw in the facts from real life. If feminists did not do this, their preaching would have zero appeal to the non-feminist sector, because it would seem to have no bearing on the experiential world. Feminism is anti-contextual in the sense that the story is decided prior to the facts, but it is nevertheless dependent on the context of any particular situation. The real life context must first be experienced and understood, and only then can it be co-opted into feminist discourse. To take a clear example, feminists in the United States today do not agitate for women’s right to vote. They would get nowhere if they did, because, having the vote, they have nowhere else to go (in this regard). The franchise is not now a relevant issue in the context of the real world. On the other hand, the fact that most business leaders are men will be verified by most people’s experiences of the world; this, then, can be drawn into feminist discourse, as an example of Oppression.

Forgive me for being overly simplistic. It must be made clear how the process of manufacturing Struggle is playing a pivotal role in the changing nature of rights.

What is a right? As it has typically been understood, a right is a claim which, in usual circumstances, is inviolable. In other words, if I have a right, then I have some kind of claim – the permission to do something I wish to do, or to be protected from something I do not wish for – and other individuals may not deprive me of this claim. To take a clear example, I have the right not to be assaulted – other individuals are not permitted to assault me. They may do so nonetheless, in which case they have transgressed against my right; they have done what they are not permitted to do, and prevented me from doing (or avoiding) those things which I am permitted to do (or avoid). Accordingly, I am permitted to seek recompense for the violation of my right.

A theory of rights requires an enforcer, in order to prevent rights transgressions and provide recompense to those whose rights have been violated. The enforcer that we are familiar with is the state, particularly those institutions involved in the creation and practise of law: the legislature, the judiciary, the police force, and so on. It is necessary that the state possesses the monopoly on the use of force, else its rule would go unenforced, and there would be no deterrent against rights violations. In an extreme case, the citizens may rise up and overthrow a weak state, subsequently instituting their own form of justice which may be far from impartial. Max Weber famously described the state as “the monopoly of the legitimate use of force.” I have left out the word ‘legitimate’ from my definition here, because it strikes me as an entirely subjective judgment, not to mention an inevitable one from the point of view of those in control of the state. Those who seize power and use it to persecute one section of the population will surely believe their own monopoly on the use of force to be legitimate – indeed, they will most likely believe their own use of force to be of greater legitimacy than that of the regime which they deposed, no matter how that regime conducted itself.

Note that there is no inherent limitation to the concept of rights; there is no in-built brake system. There can never be a point where we say, “now we have all the rights.” There will always be potentially more rights that we could possess. That is not to say we categorically should possess more rights. The full possession of all conceivable rights would be an inconceivable license – total autonomy, in which all claims would be permitted. This would mean that the individual with license would be free to violate the rights of others. In this case, the rights of others would be meaningless whenever they encounter the licensed individual. Logically, all people cannot have total possession of all rights, because each would be permitted to infringe upon the rights of all the others – which means that nobody’s rights would be secure, and the strongest individual or group would be entitled to establish arbitrary rule by physical force alone.

founding-fathers

Clearly we need limitations, and the Constitution of the United States of America is the exemplar in this regard. As the finest statement of personal liberty and representative democracy the world has ever known, it exists to protect a number of fundamental rights from being overturned by the strongest collection of individuals – namely, the government. Laws may come and go, but so long as the constitution is upheld, the foundational rights of the individual citizen are set in stone – or, at least, are extremely difficult to remove or alter. Where a government repeatedly violates its own constitution, it (ideally, at least) runs the risk of being overthrown by an uprising of citizens, who would, together, form a stronger collective.

The United States Constitution, adopted in 1787, built upon the liberal philosophy of the time, most especially that of John Locke. Sections of the Declaration of Independence, signed eleven years previous, are more or less lifted from his Second Treatise of Government. The ideas expressed in this work are not those of the liberalism we know today; they sit somewhere closer to what we would now term libertarianism. It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that liberalism underwent the profound transformation into the collectivist ideology we more readily associate with the term today.

In his 1859 text, On Liberty, J. S. Mill introduced a new articulation of the traditional liberal moral defence of individual rights. It runs something like this: individuals have the right to do whatever they choose, so long as this does not harm others. Mill exercised caution when considering the application of this principle: one would not be harmed, for instance, by losing in open competition (e.g. the free market). Following Tocqueville, he voiced concern that democracy, if unmoderated, could devolve into majoritarian tyranny.

We may thank the successors of Mill for the perversion of individualist liberalism into a collectivist and authoritarian philosophy. It was one small step from Mill’s axiom – individuals have the right to do whatever they choose, so long as this does not harm others – to the doctrine of New Liberalism: if I cannot do what I would otherwise choose, then somebody must be harming me. It was the self-proclaimed ‘liberal socialist,’ Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse, who built upon Mill’s premises and added a new twist: that freedom is not good in and of itself, but must be subordinated to some higher end. It follows that any freedom which is not subordinated to this higher end is not morally justified. It was the social radical Richard Henry Tawney, building on this development, who advocated an egalitarian society based on the premise that “freedom for the pike is death for the minnows” – in other words, that certain identifiable groups are not deserving of equal autonomy, but must have their share restricted. It was Lester Frank Ward who disavowed the individual altogether and argued that the state should direct all social and economic development, including the happiness of its citizens. Perhaps most tellingly of all, he was an enthusiastic supporter of the notion that women are innately superior to men. To quote an especially relevant passage:

And now from the point of view of intellectual development itself we find her side by side, and shoulder to shoulder with him furnishing, from the very outset, far back in prehistoric, presocial, and even prehuman times, the necessary complement to his otherwise one-sided, headlong, and wayward career, without which he would soon have warped and distorted the race and rendered it incapable of the very progress which he claims exclusively to inspire. And herefore again, even in the realm of intellect, where he would fain reign supreme, she has proved herself fully his equal and is entitled to her share of whatever credit attaches to human progress hereby achieved.

The purpose of this detour into the changing nature of rights was to hone in on the historical developments that precipitated certain aspects of modern feminism. Some contributors to the Men’s Rights Movement have somewhat abstractly attacked ‘modernity’ and ‘Enlightenment values.’ This is fine if they are intending to attack individual autonomy in general, but we must look more carefully if we actually want to get to the root of the problems facing men, as men, today – which, I would argue, coalesce into the deprivation of male autonomy. It is modernity, and particularly Enlightenment thought, which made individual autonomy a possibility – and it is social liberalism, and most especially feminism, which are turning it into an impossibility for men.

ScalesOfJustice

 

The innovation of social liberalism is conspicuous in the section of the Ward quote above which I have emphasized. It is entitlement; the creation of new obligations for others to fulfil; the construction of rights claims, not rights of individuals, to be held equally, but against an identified segment of the population (the ‘enemy’ group). Of course, every right, if it is taken seriously, demands obligations of others – if I have a right to not be assaulted, then you must not assault me, and vice versa. The difference between such a claim and the claims of New Liberalism is that the former is an obligation to inaction, while the latter is an obligation to action. My obligations to inaction mean that I cannot transgress certain boundaries – the rights of other people. I may not hurt them, steal from them, or do damage to their possessions. I am forbidden to do certain things which would interfere with the autonomy of others, but apart from that, I am free to do as I please. Obligations to action are of a different sort altogether: the one who holds me to such an obligation has the power to command me. I am told how to act, and I am forbidden to act any other way. This curtails my autonomy.

For instance, if you require some object in order to accomplish a certain project, then your autonomy is curtailed if you do not possess the object. Therefore, you have a claim to my object, presuming that I possess one. It matters not if I have earned or otherwise rightfully own my object; the theory goes that you should have it anyway. Claims of ownership and desert are subordinated to the autonomy of individuals, which translates to the wants (not needs) of specially identified ‘victim’ groups. If, say, I am interviewing a man and a woman for a position in my employ, and the woman demands that she be given the job as a crucial step in her career plan, I am denying her autonomy by not employing her, even if she is the least qualified candidate. She needs the position in order to achieve what she ultimately wants, and so she is wronged if she does not get it. The doctrine of New Liberalism – if I am unable to do what I would otherwise choose, then somebody must be harming me – clearly serves the victim agenda of feminism. Any limit whatsoever on the actions of women, including those introduced in the name of fairness and impartiality, can be taken as a new Oppression according to this doctrine.

‘New’ or ‘social’ liberalism is in fact the perversion and corruption of liberalism – and it finds its highest expression in the caste system of rights feminists are busy creating. Women’s rights, a catch phrase once trumpeted as a progressive march towards a fairer future, has become the trump card that never loses its value, ready to be played any time a woman wants to ‘get one over the guys’. In the early days, the idea of Struggle was more creditable, and even seems admirable in retrospect. Women struggled for rights which men possessed: the right to vote, the right to own property, the right to divorce, the right to the same wage as a man doing the same job. Once upon a time, it was perfectly plausible, to an unbiased observer, that feminism meant to bring about equality between the sexes. That is not to say this view is inherently correct, only that it was believable, from a point of view external to feminism, that the feminist project carried this altruistic goal.

But what are the women’s rights advocated today? The right to confiscate men’s money, the right to commit parental alienation, the right to commit paternity fraud, the right to equal pay for less work, the right to pay a lower tax rate, the right to mutilate men, the right to confiscate sperm, the right to murder children, the right to not be disagreed with, the right to reproductive choice and the right to make that choice for men as well. In an interesting legal paradox, some have advocated – with success – that women should have the right to not be punished for crimes at all. The eventual outcome of this is a kind of sexual feudalism, where women rule arbitrarily, and men are held in bondage, with fewer rights and far more obligations. To date, the transformation of rights into obligations to action have given us a welfare state in which, according to The Futurist,

virtually all government spending […] from Medicare to Obamacare to welfare to public sector jobs for women to the expansion of the prison population, is either a net transfer of wealth from men to women, or a byproduct of the destruction of Marriage 1.0. In either case, ‘feminism’ is the culprit […] Remember again that the earnings of men pays 70%-80% of all taxes.

Feminism views the independence of individual citizens as a barrier, not a safeguard. Personal autonomy hinders feminism’s progress in moralizing the world and bleeding men dry for the benefit of women.

Women’s rights? It’s nothing but a power grab.

Adam
Further Reading:

Michael Weiss and Cathy Young. Feminist Jurisprudence: Equal Rights or Neo-Paternalism?

Founding Fathers of the United States. The Declaration of Independence

Pelle Billing. Men’s Rights Manifesto

 

GYNOCENTRISM THEORY LECTURE SERIES:
1. Staring Out From the Abyss
2. The Same Old Gynocentric Story
3. Refuting the Appeal to Dictionary
4. Pig Latin
5. Anatomy of a Victim Ideology
6. Old Wine, New Bottles
7. The Personal, as Contrasted to the Political
8. Chasing Rainbows
9. False Consciousness & Kafka-Trapping
10. The Eventual Outcome of Feminism, Part I
11. The Eventual Outcome of Feminism, Part II
12. How to Break a Dialectic

The Personal, as Contrasted to the Political

Lecture No. 7

“They prided themselves on belonging to a movement, as distinguished from a party, and a movement could not be bound by a program.” – Hannah Arendt

Last week, we looked at how the concept of domination has become a justification for encroaching despotism. It should not come as a shock to attentive readers that virtually every keyword in the feminist lexicon is used in a similar way. Whether the term being discussed is misogyny or rape or patriarchy, the tendency is to broaden its meaning to cover as wide a semantic area as possible, smuggling the maximum possible ideological contraband within an overcoat of righteousness. The real-world effect of all this is to restrict male autonomy through the criminalization of men’s actions. The limitless possibilities for semantic bleaching correspond to extensive prison sentences and crippling fines. The intention is to criminalize the norm. Every move that a man makes should send a shiver down his spine, should force him to look over his shoulder, with a panic-stricken expression, wondering, “what new law have I just broken?” Men are to live in a perpetual state of surveillance and presumed guilt – a panoptical existence in which they are repeatedly chastized for doing wrong. That is, according to an invasive, alien moral standard that they are invited to obey, not understand, and certainly not to question or refute.

But when the criminalized behavior falls within the domain of actions in which both men and women engage, the argument requires a corollary that it is different, and worse, when men do it. For instance, certain nasty individuals of both sexes engage in sexual harassment, but we must understand that when men do it to women, it is chalk, and when women do it to men, it is cheese. The two, we are assured, are incomparable, regardless of how a victimized man might see things – after all, even in his victimhood, he is blinkered by his privilege.

The whole fairy tale is aptly summed up in the feminist mantra, the personal is political. As was discussed last week, the proper context in which this claim should be viewed is the recent history of the Western world. Particular focus should be given to a current within our shared political culture, which has given rise to despotic government and threatens to do so again. How else are we to interpret a statement that all things within the domain of the individual are in fact the business of government? If we do not own or control those things which are personal to us, there cannot be anything to speak of that we do own or control, up to and including our lives.

But it would be a mistake to view the mantra simply as a statement of belief, i.e. that its speaker merely believes the personal to be political. All manner of people have all manner of kooky theories, and a group of people communicating their belief that all aspects of our lives are managed by the state would be about as troubling as tin foil conspiracy theorists or the Flat Earth Society. When a feminist says that the personal is political, however, she is not simply stating a belief; she is making a call to action. There are implications hidden within the phrase.

Last week’s discussion involved a section on ideologies, and the progressivist assumptions at the roots of Western political culture. To recap, ideologies assume a difference between how society is and how it ought to be, predicated upon a specific moral view of the world. What this means, as far as feminist analysis is concerned, is that if the personal is not currently political, then it should be made that way. Practically all feminist innovation consists of making those things which are personal into political matters. The logical end-point is to be found where there are no strictly personal actions, no personal utterances, intentions, thoughts or beliefs; all of these, expressed publicly or privately, would be strictly political. Every decision, down to the minutiae details of everyday life, becomes a political matter for which individuals are held to account, not as individual transgressors, but as members of an oppressive class which must answer for its sins.

ship

 

‘The political’ is another one of those essentially contested concepts – in other words, it is one of those concepts most open to abuse. It is an elusive idea, which can be grasped but never precisely pinned down – and attempts to do so are rather like trying to grab all the air in an inflatable mattress. One of the things we can say about ‘the political,’ is that it has not always been identified with ‘the ideological’ – which seems sensible enough, since ‘the ideological’ is a product of modernity, a relative newcomer as far as politics is concerned.

Once upon a time, ‘the political’ was a term which referred to Kings, Queens, courtiers and nobles, their struggles and their successions; but certainly not to doctrine. That change came about gradually, with the steady fall of religious fervor that marks modernity.

I am aware that I skate close to etymological fallacy, so let me clarify what I am arguing. I am not complaining that there is a proper meaning of terms such as ‘the political’ which has fallen out of fashion. I have previously acknowledged that language is forever in flux. As a corollary, I do recognize that objectively correct definitions are something of a rarity. My purpose, in highlighting linguistic change, is a correlative highlighting of social change! The one rarely undergoes a paradigm shift without bringing the other along. There is immense power in language, to not only reflect but to define the experiential world. If we want to understand how things came to be the way that they are, we should cast a searing torch beam over historic changes in vocabulary – it is here that we will find the notional germ cells that gave rise to the feminist disease.

Such as in the case of ‘the political’. Today, everything controversial is reflexively considered a political matter. Whether we are discussing a person’s unusual lifestyle, or a new work of art that pushes boundaries, or a website that advances an innovative worldview, we feel quite certain that what we are discussing is a political statement. The controversial, then is political; or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the unusual is political. Non-conformists of all stripes are prompted to attach some political purpose to their actions or beliefs. The effect of this very public challenge is to lock individuals into a system of pervasive control; stepping out of line makes one into a target.

And this is precisely what feminism requires – for men to stand in line, and to target those who do not. It’s a lot easier to pursue the project for increasing the power of women when you can effectively gag those who stand to lose the most from its success.

The flip side to all this is women’s exponentially increasing and ‘compensatory’ license. It is men alone whose private lives are to be locked into the system of public control; women, in contrast, are to enjoy the spoils of victory in a new era of female sexual anarchism. Perhaps the only consolation we can realistically take is that despotisms are great generators of spiritual enlightenment among the oppressed. It was the persecution of early Christians that drove pious men and women to live alone in the desert, in imitation of Jesus Christ – it was only in the fifth century that these monastics were co-opted into the Church, having sought a purely ascetic existence as an alternative to the material world that had driven them out. Similarly, the oppressive regimes of the Hellenistic period led many in the Greek city-states to embrace mystical philosophies which advocated turning away from the world. Given that we are well on our way towards feminist despotism, it is not surprising that a parallel development is fledgling, in the form of the Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW) movement. MGTOW have rejected the Gynocentric demand that men must define themselves according to their sexual prowess. Accordingly unburdened, many MGTOW have taken up introspective deliberation on the nature of man and masculinity – discussions which are androcentric and therefore not accountable to feminist orthodoxy. At its core, the MGTOW movement turns away from the world – from marriage, children, self-sacrificing employment, even relationships with women altogether – seeking solace from hostile agents as did the ascetics and mystics of the ancient world.

Although I endorse the MGTOW lifestyle, I am conscious that it is not enough – for fulfillment or for survival. Feminism is simply not in the business of leaving men alone. It is a progressivist ideology, which means it just keeps on growing, with no internal checks on its own activities; it has no brakes! All attempted self-criticism yields to further radicalization. Unable to perceive the world from outside of the feminist bubble, its disciples think and act in an anti-contextual, abstract fashion. The only checks on the activities of such ideologies must come from the outside – i.e., from the rest of society. If feminism will not slow down and stop of its own accord, then external agents must build a brick wall in its path. This is a moral requirement – the alternative is to allow it free reign, in which case we will inevitably end up with despotism. Thus far, feminism has proved remarkably socio-dynamic, and has faced very little political resistance – meaning that the velocity of persecution is set to increase.

I should like to clarify. The word ‘feminism’ can refer to more than one thing. Most obviously, feminism the movement is the not precisely the same thing as feminism the ideology; rather, the former is driven by the dictates of the latter. Feminism the ideology is a victim ideology, which means that it exists in defense of a certain class of people which has been designated as the victims. The dual objectives goals of a victim ideology are, as I have remarked previously:

(1) To equalize with the ‘enemy’ group;

(2) To forge its own ‘victim identity,’ separate from and unaccountable to the ‘enemy’ group.

If objective (1) is ever achieved, then the ideology simply ceases to be, which means that the movement also ceases to be. The movement, however, is not an inorganic entity which mechanistically fulfills the needs of the ideology. It is made up of people who have become dependent upon it, psychologically and financially. The end of inequality, however it was originally measured, would spell disaster for Women’s Studies graduates everywhere. For instance, the inability of feminist organizations to admit that rape rates are falling and that false allegations are reaching epidemic levels is down to the losses that would be sustained by ideologues sitting in (usually empty) rape crisis centers. The ideology cannot be permitted to die – there is far too much riding on it, namely, the movement, and whatever goodies its principal actors have managed to get their paws on. As with many people, the threat of redundancy is enough to bring out a hard-line conservatism, which insists, in this case, on the existence of brand new oppressions still to be overcome. There is an awful lot of money riding on the continued perception that women are disadvantaged. Feminism is not merely a movement any more, but an industry – aptly referred to by some as the sexual grievance industry.

Should this industry crash, it would leave a hole in the purses of career feminists nearly as large as the hole it would leave between their ears. The alternative to continued state support for the overcoming of new oppressions is almost unthinkable. It would not only mean an end to men subsidizing their own persecution – it would also threaten to leave a psychic vacuum in the minds of professional feminists. Whatever would they do, should they be deprived of their blood money?

The feminists do, of course, have a backup plan. I refer you to objective (2). The reason why victim ideologies tend to die hard when equality or even supremacy of the ‘victim’ group is achieved is this: they shift their aims towards the inherent separateness of the ‘victim’ and ‘enemy’ groups, and refuse accountability to the rest of the world. Indeed, any attempt by a person external to the designated ‘victim’ group, to hold the members of said group accountable for their transgressions, is tarnished as the effort to roll back objective (1) – and the person who dared to raise the complaint will be called any number of amazing names.

A victim ideology is necessarily tripartite in its understanding of time. The past is identified with Oppression, the present with Struggle, and the future with Liberation. This tripartite historiography is a constant. If any one of the three states – Oppression, Struggle or Liberation – is removed, then we no longer have a victim ideology. It falls apart, owing to its inconsistency. There must have been past Oppression, as this justifies the present Struggle, which also must be the case for the present, as a matter of tautology -; what else would we be talking about? Struggle must be towards something, and this is Liberation, promised in the future. Below is a diagram of sorts, presented from the feminist perspective:

ideology1

 

It is a childish caricature, fitting for a childish worldview. Note what is required for the tripartite Oppression, Struggle, Liberation to make sense – the actor who did the oppressing, who must be struggled against, and from whom the designated victims shall be liberated. This is, of course, men.

The above picture is presented from the feminist perspective, in which time moves horizontally, from left to right. In the real world, time’s arrow is broken. We are frozen permanently in the present phase, and from there, time moves vertically and downwards:

ideology2

 

There is simply too much riding on feminism (i.e. the sexual grievance industry) to allow the actual liberation of women to be acknowledged. If it were to be admitted that women are not only liberated, but the recipients of a number of advantages over men, then the movement and the ideology, and thus the industry that is feminism, would become moot. Women’s current role, which is perhaps more appropriately described as Privileged, is not even conceivable on feminist time. Liberation must always remain a future goal, and can never be permitted as a present achievement. Feminism is self-sustaining this way – by forever propelling itself into new Struggles. The tripartite understanding of timeis independent of context; it is fundamentally abstract and anti-contextual. The tripartite is assumed before the truth about the world at any given moment is ascertained, and the facts of the world must then be hammered out into a feminist-friendly shape.

It is of little consequence that all the great Struggles have been won. Feminists can just create new ones. And since men are (as the case must always be) the oppressors to be struggled against, it is quite justifiable to take away whatever power they still possess.

Until they possess none.

Adam


Further Reading:

Fidelbogen. The Bright Line

Adrian Smyth. Feminism: The Birthplace of

Sexist Hypocrisy

Archivist. The ‘under-reporting’ canard

 

GYNOCENTRISM THEORY LECTURE SERIES:
1. Staring Out From the Abyss
2. The Same Old Gynocentric Story
3. Refuting the Appeal to Dictionary
4. Pig Latin
5. Anatomy of a Victim Ideology
6. Old Wine, New Bottles
7. The Personal, as Contrasted to the Political
8. Chasing Rainbows
9. False Consciousness & Kafka-Trapping
10. The Eventual Outcome of Feminism, Part I
11. The Eventual Outcome of Feminism, Part II
12. How to Break a Dialectic

The Feminists: a book review

Many people have read Orwell’s prophetic book 1984, but almost none has heard of the 1971 pulp fiction novel The Feminists, an equally prophetic work detailing events that have unfolded -and continue to unfold- in the area of gender politics. By way of introduction here’s the blurb from the back cover:

the feminists - front coverTHE STORY THAT HAD TO BE WRITTEN—SO TIMELY, SO FRIGHTENINGLY POSSIBLE, YOU WON’T BELIEVE IT’S FICTION!Take a look into the future…women now rule the world—or most of what’s left of it—and their world is not a pretty place to live in. Men have been reduced to mere chattel, good only for procreation. THE FEMINISTS are working to eliminate even this strictly male function…

Men must get permission to make love to any female—even if she is willing—or the penalty is death!

Follow one man’s story as he is hunted for just such a crime. In desperation, he stumbles upon the hide-out of the subterranean people—others, like himself—both male and female—who have broken the law of THE FEMINISTS. Hiding in abandoned subway undergrounds, this group of gallant and desperate people wage a guerilla war to overthrow their enslavers.

Set in the year 1992, the story recounts the rise of misandry and feminist governance that saw women take charge of every aspect of civilization, and of a growing resistance movement (to feminism) that mirrors the sentiment of men’s rights groups that have formed in the decades since the book was first written. The story tells of how one resistance group, while living in a network of secret underground tunnels, plans and executes a successful bombing (which I hasten to add no one in the MHRM would ever consider doing) at a public gathering attended by both the feminist President and a mayor named Verna. The deed is one of many attempts to undermine feminist governance and hasten the end of misandric culture.

During the bombing, the feminist President is injured. From a hospital bed she organizes an emergency meeting with executive members of her government, including her old friend and mayor, Verna, who was also witness to the bombing. The following excerpt below is the pivotal scene in which the President addresses her guests, and where she makes the intriguing suggestion that an increase in female MHRA’s has made it impossible for feminist governance to continue. – PW

***

The president glanced from one to the other of the women, her eyes finally settling on Verna and softening as if she was remembering their long years of friendship during the rise to power. She smiled weakly and then fixed her gaze on her own hands. There was a look of defeat on her face.”It has been the policy of our administration to conceal the unfavorable aspect of Feminist control,” she said, her voice almost a monotone. “I’ve spoken to some of you individually about the resistance in Los Angeles and Chicago.”

”The pigs can be overcome,” the Secretary of Defense interrupted. “We beat them once, we can do it again!”

”No,” the president said firmly. “We won’t beat them again. We are no longer merely fighting the male element of society. An increasing number of females have joined forces with the men.

“Traitors!”

The president lifted her head and stared at the Secretary of Defense coldly. “This country,” she said, “is in the midst of a revolution like it has never known. The only thing keeping us from being ousted is the lack of communication. If the revolutionists in each city did not think they were fighting alone, they would be in control. Fortunately we’ve dissected the country by cutting off all forms of communication.” She met Verna’s stunned face. “The resistance movement in New York has been minor in comparison,” she said. “But all these groups will soon unite. It’s inevitable.”

The Mayor, feeling her legs growing weak, turned and sank into a chair.

“The time has come for us to objectively examine our control,” the President said. “Unless we return the rights to males that make them equals, our country will be torn apart.”

“But they’re not equals!” the Secretary of Defense insisted.

“Thirty percent of the female population has suddenly decided they are, “ the President said. “To retain control we would be fighting our own sex.” She closed her eyes and sighed wearily. “In short,” she said, “we must face the fact that Feminist control has failed.”

The mayor felt as if she had been struck. “Then it’s all been in vain,” she mumbled.

”Not entirely,” the President told her. “Not if we concede now. Unless we allow ourselves to be beaten and forced into male servitude, we can maintain our dignity. Remember, I said equals. In the future, men will consider us in higher esteem. Many of the changes we have brought about will remain in effect. Our control, even though only temporary, has proven that our sex does not make us inferior. “

”Is this what you intend to tell the public?”

”It is.”

”You will create mass hysteria.”

”I don’t think so,” the President said. “Granted, there will always be a segment that will resent my decision to reunite the sexes. I suppose there will be guerilla fighters who refuse to comply, but they will be a minority. I only hope none of you are among them. There are many problems our country must face once the question of sexual superiority is conquered. All of us are needed. We must rebuild our environment and stop starvation.”

***

Source: The Feminists, by Parley J. Cooper (pp. 173-75) Pinnacle Books, 1971